THE FINAL BALANCE SHEET? THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S
CHALLENGES AND CONCESSIONS TO THE WESTPHALIAN MODEL
Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto*
[…. The approval of this Court [International Criminal Court] was indeed ‘a turn in the road
of history.’ By ceding the authority to define and punish crimes, many nations took an
irrevocable step to the loss of national sovereignty and the reality of global government. I, for
one, am heartened to see that the United States took the right turn on the road of history, and
I will work hard to ensure there is no backtracking.]1
I. Introduction
French political thinker Jean Bodin offered the first systematic approach to the theory of
sovereignty in his work, Les Six Livres De La Republique2 in 1576. He defined sovereignty as
the ‘State’s supreme authority over citizens and subjects.’3 Half a century later in 1625, Hugo
Grotius in his seminal work De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libris Tres,4 maintained that the laws
governing relations among nations must first safeguard the sovereignty of States themselves
holding that rules preventing interference in another State’s jurisdiction would help safeguard
this sovereignty. According to Grotius, other principles of international law5 would emerge as
a consequence of the lasting arrangements that sovereign States make among themselves.6
Essentially, sovereignty began as a domestic term in a domestic context. It referred to
relations between rulers and those they ruled, between the ‘sovereign’ and his or her subjects.
As the term entered the parlance of international law, States continued to emphasise the

*

LL.B (Hons), (Moi); LL.M (Cantab; PhD (Melb). Lecturer in law, University of Newcastle.
John Ashcroft (then US Senator, now current US Attorney General), commenting on the International Criminal
Court during a hearing on the matter in the US Senate. ‘Is a UN International Criminal Court in the U.S.
National Interest?: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations’, 105th Cong 1 (1998) 29.
2
J Bodin, The Six Books of a Commonwealth, (6 Vols, Kenneth Douglas McRae, ed, 1962).
3
Ibid Vol I at 84.
4
Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres [The Law of War and Peace] (Francis W Kelsey, trans, 1925).
5
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) is generally credited with coining the phrase ‘international law’ in his
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). Before that the accepted expression had been
‘law of nations,’ which Bentham regarded as insufficiently explicit since it seemed ‘to refer to internal
jurisprudence.’ Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremburg Trials: A Personal Memoir (1992) at 6.
6
Grotius, De Jure Belli, above n 4 at 102-104, 133.
1

1

domestic implications of the concept and worked to establish each others’ right to exclusive
jurisdiction and control over their own territory.

Following the Thirty Years’ War, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia attempted to codify an
international system based on the coexistence of a plurality of States exercising unimpeded
sovereignty within their territories thus enshrining untrammelled State sovereignty and
freedom from outside interference as the foundation of modern international law. After three
decades of war between Catholics and Protestants, the Peace of Westphalia sought to separate
the powers of church and State. In so doing, it transferred to Nation-States the special godlike
features of church authority. States inherited sovereignty, and with it an unassailable position
above the law that has since remained the central element of international relations.
Sovereignty is a notion which, perhaps more than any other, has come to dominate our
understanding of national and international life. Its history parallels the evolution of the
modern State. Much of the confusion surrounding the concept arises from the many
connotations it has acquired over the centuries, in particular from its association with notions
of, national interest, national independence and national security, but also with the notion of
strength understood as the State’s capacity to impose its will whether on its own citizens or
other States. Like private ownership, sovereignty implies absolute rights to territory and the
prohibition of trespass by others. The enclosure of territory by sovereign boundaries separates
internal from external space.

To be sovereign is to be subject to no higher power. For more than three centuries,
international relations have been structured around the legal fiction that States have exclusive
(sovereign) jurisdiction over their territory and its occupants and resources. Most of the
fundamental norms, rules, and practices of international relations rest on the premise of State
Even many characteristic violations of sovereignty are themselves rooted in State sovereignty,
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that is, in the absence of political power or legal authority above States. There has always
been tension, however, between State sovereignty and other values that call into question its
primacy. Sovereignty is a legal fiction that continues to evolve. It is not an immutable feature
of the human condition. In fact, the Permanent Court of International justice pointed out in
1923 that ‘the question of whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of
a State is an essentially relative question; it depends on the development of international
relations’.

Although hardcore realists still cling to the notion that States are supreme, reality points to the
fact that international law norms have developed rules whose aim is to modulate the behavior
of States. This implies violation of or intrusion upon local authority. International penal
process has significantly contributed to the threatening of the overall concept of sovereignty.
The significance of international penal process and its accompanying tenet of international
justice reflects an evolution in the perception of sovereignty heralding a qualitative shift
which necessitates an ethical vision in which human values supersede State rights. This
Article is premised on the contention that international penal institutions have contributed to a
diminution of the State’s supremacy by acknowledging that though States remain the
principal actors on the international scene, there is limitation on their internal power and
authority manifest in the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) goal of attempting to influence
the behavior of individuals at all levels of authority and power through enforcement of
international criminal and humanitarian law. This entails an ‘interfering’ in political processes
to alter outcomes by placing restrictions on the State’s freedom of action and exercise of its
sovereign power.

Although the State has expanded its capabilities for control and involvement in some areas,
overall the trend in international criminal and humanitarian law has been toward the
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‘diminution of State authority’ with authority being relocated both upward to international
penal institutions and downward as individuals and groups assert themselves as subjects of
international law. The institutionalisation of international penal process represents a shift in
authority from States to the international community. International penal process when put in
opposition to the State, is the enemy of State power. The notion of international justice now
points towards a sphere that though controlled by States, is ineffaceably external to power.
Given the far-reaching transformation of the social and political landscape we have witnessed
in the last century, there has been a transformation of the concept and practice of sovereignty
through the development of international penal process.

The International Criminal Court was the last great international institution of the 20th
Century. In the words of Sadat and Carden:
It is no exaggeration to suggest that its creation has the potential to reshape our thinking about
international law. For if many aspects of the Rome Statute demonstrate the tenacity of traditional
Westphalian notions of State sovereignty, there are nonetheless elements of supranationalism and
efficacy (in spite of the complementarity principle) in the Statute that could prove extremely powerful.
Not only does the Statute place State and non-State actors side-by-side in the international arena, but
the Court will put real people in real jails. Indeed, the establishment of the Court raises hopes that the
lines between international law on the one hand, and world order, on the other, are blurring and that
the normative structure being created by international law might influence or even restrain the
Hobbesian order established by the politics of States.7

This Article examines the organization and operating principles of the Court. Many aspects of
the Rome Statute8 challenge fundamental tenets of the structure of international law existing
heretofore. No analysis could address all the aspects of this new international institution and
the Article seeks to focus attention on some of its major features impacting on State
sovereignty--the focus of this Article. Part II of the Article explores the structure and
competence of the Court and in particular the powers of the prosecutor, general principles
7
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underlying the jurisdiction of the Court, the formulation of the complementarity principle in
the Court’s Statute, the manner in which cases will come to the Court and be decided and the
State cooperation regime. It examines the State cooperation regime governing the conduct of
investigations and prosecutions on State territory and the arrest of suspects and their surrender
to the Court noting that the Court’s enforcement jurisdiction is paltry, at best, suggesting the
unease of States to the idea of a permanent international penal process. Part III, is a general
reflection on the merits and demerit of the International Criminal Court.

II. Structure and Competence of the International Criminal Court
The Rome Statute envisages that the Court will have four organs: the Presidency, the
Judiciary (which is composed of three divisions: Appeals, Trial, and Pre-Trial Divisions), the
Office of the Prosecutor, and the Registry.9 The Statute provides that the judges are all to be
elected as full-time members of the Court,10 and that the Prosecutor, Deputy Prosecutors,11and
Registrar12 shall also serve on a full-time basis. This was a major improvement over earlier
proposals for the ICC, virtually all of which conceived of the Court as a ‘stand by’
institution,13 whose personnel would largely be part-time.14 The Statute also expressly
addresses the need for continuing oversight by the States Parties by establishing an Assembly
of States Parties and providing rules for its organization and operation.
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2.1. The Office of the Prosecutor: A Watershed for States Trust and Distrust of the
International Penal Process
Under the 1994 ILC Draft Statute for an international criminal court, only States and the
Security Council could lodge complaints with the Court.15 The Rome Statute in addition also
permits the Prosecutor to bring cases before the Court on his or her own initiative.16 Defining
the powers of the Prosecutor was a highly contentious issue during the PrepCom I meetings,
specifically with respect to whether the Prosecutor should be able to act proprio motu or ex
officio, that is, on his or her own motion, in bringing cases to the Court. This issue created a
deep schism among the PrepCom I delegates, with many smaller nations, some European
nations, and the NGOs strongly supporting a Prosecutor able to act independently of State
referral,17 and many larger countries, including most of the permanent five members of the
Security Council, opposing an independent Prosecutor.18 Many States were concerned that the
independent Prosecutor could become an ‘independent counsel for the universe,’
unaccountable to anyone and liable to file complaints against States on the basis of political
prejudices rather than legal concerns.19 However, numerous procedural safeguards are built
into the Statute to prevent the Prosecutor from abusing his or her power.
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The Rome Statute grants broad powers to the prosecutor’s office of the ICC.20 Article 15 of
the Rome Statute provides that the prosecutor of the court ‘may initiate investigations proprio
motu on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.’21 Thus, the
ICC prosecutor may, on his/her own initiative, launch investigations and indict individuals for
crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. The prosecutor may investigate alleged crimes based on
the referral of the UN Security Council, State Parties, victims, NGOs, or any other reliable
source.22 The prosecutor determines the reliability of the source, as ‘he or she deems
appropriate.’23 Some groups tout the ability to obtain referrals from non-State sources (NGOs,
victims, etc.) as a most important victory because they feared States would be unwilling to
refer situations to the court.24 This is especially so based on the experience of State-based
complaints procedures in the human rights field. States rarely bring referrals and it is doubtful
whether the ICC will enjoy any greater cooperation and diligence on the part of States in
triggering court action.

With the authority to initiate investigations on his/her own, the ICC prosecutor has potential
to become an effective inquisitor with the authority to use his/her office in different States and
regions of the world wherever any matters of concern to the court arise without being unduly
shackled by national sovereignty concerns in matters that warrant his/her attention. Though
the Pre-Trial Chamber of the court has the power to deny the furtherance of an investigation
by the prosecutor,25 the prosecutor has the power to investigate situations with no oversight
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before he/she must submit it to the Pre-Trial Chamber.26 In addition, he/she may return with a
new request based on new evidence regarding the same situation.27 Therefore, a persistent
prosecutor, backed by groups or individuals, may pursue a particular individual or group
he/she believes responsible for a crime until the Pre-Trial Chamber allows the investigation to
proceed towards court action. The United States and several other nations felt this power was
too broad. This is a critical reason for the United States declining to ratify the Statute.

One of the greatest concerns expressed by non-signing States is the prosecutor’s power to
initiate an investigation without supervision of any kind. There is no requirement that the
prosecutor act on the request of a sovereign State or at the direction of an international
organization such as the United Nations Security Council. The prosecutor is completely
independent, without any accountability (other than to the ICC).28 Nothing in the Statute it is
argued, appears to limit this power. Proponents of the court claim that the power of the
prosecutor is not as broad or unlimited as the Court’s opponents make it out to be. The
limitations they point to arise in Article 53 of the Statute and consist mainly of a set of factors
the prosecutor should consider before pursuing an investigation. Article 53 states:

The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or her, initiate an
investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this
statute. In determining whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether:
(a) The information available . . . provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed;
(b) The case is . . . admissible under Article 17; and
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interest of the victims, there are nonetheless
substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.29
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Opponents of the Court argue that these discretionary considerations amount to limitations
addressing only whether a crime has been committed, whether jurisdiction exists,
admissibility of evidence, and other potential overriding political concerns. These reservations
are minimal. The Statute contains qualifications that allow the prosecutor to have great
leeway in initiating investigations. For example, ‘reasonable basis’ is a low bar to
investigation. Therefore, the discretion of the prosecutor is quite broad, extending to all
aspects of evidence gathering, taking of oral and written testimony, and so forth.30

2.2. Scope of the Court’s Jurisdiction
2.2.1. Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae
The ILC Draft Statute originally conceived of four separate jurisdictional hurdles that would
be prerequisites to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction in any particular case: First, none of
the crimes except genocide were within the Court’s ‘inherent’ jurisdiction (competence
propre), but instead were subject to a complex regime of State consent that was bypassed only
in cases referred to the Court by the Security Council;

31

Second, States could (again, except

in the case of a Security Council referral) limit the jurisdiction of the Court accepted by them
in advance by lodging a declaration to that effect with the depositary;32 Third, the Security
Council had to make a determination of aggression for a complaint on that basis to be
receivable by the Court. Fourth, assuming subject matter jurisdiction (competence) to be
generally present, all cases had to be ‘admissible’ in keeping with the principle of
complementarity on which the Statute of the Court was predicated.33
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The Rome Statute extends the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to four crimes:34 genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and aggression.35 In rejecting a ‘Court a la carte’, the Statute
now requires all States Parties to accept the Court’s inherent jurisdiction over all crimes in
Article 5, and no longer permits reservations with respect to the Court’s jurisdiction over
particular offences.36 It also reduces, but in no way eliminates, the power of the Security
Council over ongoing proceedings by permitting the Council to interfere only if it adopts a
resolution under Chapter VII requesting the Court not to commence an investigation or
prosecution, or to defer any proceeding already in progress.37

Despite the Rome Statute’s extension of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction over four core
crimes, the subject matter of the Court is narrower than Article 20 of the original ILC Draft
Statute, which envisaged that the Court would also be able to hear cases involving treaty
crimes.38 Restricting subject matter jurisdiction in this way was largely positive, for it
permitted the Diplomatic Conference to strengthen the compulsory nature of the Court’s
jurisdiction, which, as originally conceived by the International Law Commission, was largely
optional.39 Because the Preparatory Committee also felt strongly that the Court’s Statute
should define the crimes within its jurisdiction, rather than simply list them, as the ILC had
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done, inclusion of some of the treaty crimes was problematic given difficulties in reaching a
consensus on their definition.40

Frighteningly, to apprehensive States, many advocates of the ICC desire to expand the court’s
jurisdiction beyond the core offences of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
aggression.41 The Final Act adopted by the delegates to the Rome Conference recommends an
additional conference to ‘consider the crimes of terrorism and drug crimes with a view to
arriving at an acceptable definition and their inclusion in the list of crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court.’42 The amendment procedures under Article 121 of the Statute
would allow a wide range of transnational crimes currently the preserve of State-centric
mechanisms to be added to the court’s jurisdiction.43 This possible expansion of the court’s
jurisdiction is viewed by its opponents as extremely dangerous as it ‘would infringe upon a
nation’s sovereignty and ability to try crimes that affect domestic policy in their home
setting.’44 Though transnational crimes (terrorism, hostage-taking, drug-trafficking etc)
present serious problems for the international community, some States feel particularly
strongly about their inclusion in the Rome Statute considering that though proscribed under
international law, domestic justice systems remain the primary avenue for prosecuting
offenders.
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2.2.2. Jurisdiction Ratione Loci
The geographic scope of the Court’s jurisdiction, ratione loci, varies depending on the
mechanism by which the case comes to the Court. In the event that the Security Council refers
the matter, jurisdiction covers the territory of every State in the world, whether or not the
State in question is a party to the Statute.45 If the matter is referred by a State Party or initiated
proprio motu by the Prosecutor, however, the Court’s jurisdiction is more restricted but still
extensive. In such instances, jurisdiction extends to the territory of a non-State Party only if
that State consents to the jurisdiction of the Court, irrespective of whether the acts were
committed in the territory of the consenting State or the accused is a national of the
consenting State.46 The fact that this regime additionally gives the ICC jurisdiction over the
citizens of non-States Parties, allowing the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction in certain
circumstances within the territory of non-State Parties47 is considered by some States to be in
direct contravention of standing international law which binds States only to those
international agreements to which they consent.48

In cases involving a Security Council referral, the Statute’s scope is unbounded by geography.
Thus, even though Article 10 attempts to separate the Statute from customary international
law existing outside the Statute’s application, and each definition of crimes purports to define
the law only ‘for purposes of this Statute,’49 the Statute, as all have admitted, and to which the
United States has in fact strenuously objected, applies to non-State Party nationals in certain
circumstances, and can be applied by the Security Council to all the human beings of the
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world. It should be noted though that this power of the Council already inheres to the Council
independent of the ICC and any attempt to limit this power would have been inconsistent with
the UN Charter.

Opponents of the ICC argue that the greatest danger of the ICC lies in its broad jurisdiction
and the possible expansion and abuse of that jurisdiction. They point to the fact that the ICC
can exercise jurisdiction over any national of any State-Party even when in the territory of a
non-State Party, as well as over any individuals, regardless of nationality, within the territory
of a State Party.50 This was yet another of the reasons put forward by the United States
delegation to the Rome Conference for initial refusal to sign the Statute since in its final form,
the Statute extended the court’s jurisdiction to cover nationals of States not party to the
Statute.51 This amounted to an indirect grant of jurisdiction over any person involved in the
State where the crimes occurred, regardless of whether their nation was subject to the ICC.
The United States delegation sought to amend this provision, but was overwhelmingly
defeated. Therefore, the Statute signed in Rome may violate national sovereignty by indirectly
allowing jurisdiction over the nationals of States that choose not to become State Parties. A
logical ramification of this, the United States argued is that States will be less inclined to send
troops to participate in peacekeeping missions, therefore, diminishing security in some parts
of the world. Primarily for this reason, although the Clinton administration favoured the ICC,
the United States delegation refused to sign the Statute at Rome52

Overall though, with regard to the court’s jurisdiction ratione loci, there is unease with the
nature of the law being made. Legal theory and political reality conceive of international law-
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making as predominantly contractual and consensual. Yet, while the Rome Statute takes the
form of a contract between States, the law is clearly intended to have the status of custom and
even of jus cogens obligations. For objecting States, there seems to them to be a
schizophrenia about the status and binding effect of the prescriptive norms that the text
attempts to redress by, in certain limited cases, deferring to the sovereignty of States but
significantly in other aspects disregarding sovereignty.

2.2.3. Jurisdiction Ratione Personae
Firstly, the Statute provides for jurisdiction ratione personae over natural persons only
(thereby excluding organizations or States).53 The ILC, in early discussions on the question of
an international criminal court, proposed adding State culpability.54 The proposal was rejected
as ‘science fiction.’55 Secondly, unlike the ILC Draft, which was silent on the age of criminal
responsibility, the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to persons over eighteen years of age.56 The
Rome Statute establishes personal jurisdiction over the individuals in the Member States.57
Necessarily, personal jurisdiction by an international organisation raises sovereignty issues
(though not for the first time as this is manifest from the experience of the post-World War II
international military tribunals as well as the ad hoc international criminal tribunals of the
1990s). Many proponents of the ICC minimise the potential intrusions on sovereignty that
may occur. ‘Sovereignty concerns will have to be addressed; but . . . international law is
gradually moving away from a State-centrist approach towards a more moral, human rights
approach. It is imperative that this reality be recognised in the jurisdiction and the powers of
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the court.’58 This move away from a state-centred approach is certainly consistent with the
trend towards declining State sovereignty.

A crucial test for the ICC will take place over sovereignty. The individual, not the State, will
be subject to the jurisdiction of the court. It has been suggested that States may ‘run the risk
of having their nationals sent to be tried by judges possibly from enemy or rogue nations.’59
The United States thought it unlikely that any State will cede to the court’s jurisdiction over
their citizens, except when it suited their political goals.60 Therefore, the ICC would find
cooperation only when a State deemed it expedient. Even some who espouse the concept of
an ICC acknowledge the problem that sovereignty presents:
States are understandably jealous of their right to investigate and try international criminals in their
own courts. National pride leads States to have faith in the competency and fairness of their domestic
judicial systems. They do not want to surrender control over criminal cases to another tribunal.
Certainly, with the exception of the core crimes, States are capable of prosecuting the majority of
international crimes fairly and effectively, and the Statute [for the International Criminal Court]
should encourage national prosecutions when feasible. Moreover, victimized States have incentives to
pursue cases that an international tribunal might lack.61

The United States delegation attempted to resolve this at the Rome Conference by preserving
the right of reservation to specific aspects of the Statute. This proposal was soundly defeated
by the rest of the delegates. While there may remain the option of amending the Statute, some
groups are adamantly opposed to such a thought. The fear that amendments to the ICC,
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particularly by powerful nations, would only make it a tool of the UN Security Council62 is
counterbalanced by the reality that it is unlikely that those States which have demonstrated
their support for the concept of the ICC by ratifying the Statute will subsequently vote to
amend the Statute by limiting the court’s jurisdiction.

Within the context of its jurisdiction rationae personae, it should be noted that the Rome
Statute may affect criminal procedure in Third States. A notable example is double jeopardy
in domestic criminal proceedings. Article 20 of the Rome Statute imposes a double jeopardy
limitation on national jurisdictions. As Professor Gennady Danilenko observes,
[u]nder Article 20, no person who has been convicted or acquitted by the ICC for the relevant crimes
can be tried again before ‘another court’ even if they happen to be crimes under domestic laws. The
phrase ‘another court’ includes both international and domestic courts. As a result, subsequent
proceedings in domestic courts of State Parties are barred by a final order issued by the ICC. It is not
entirely clear whether a domestic trial after a final ICC order by a Third State would be consistent
with the general principle non bis in idem. Many States are bound by this principle as a matter of
treaty law… Although the practice of the Human Rights Committee indicates that non bis in idem has
only domestic application, a question may be raised as to whether it can now be reinterpreted as
having international dimensions as well.

2.3. Foundations of the Court’s Jurisdiction
One intriguing aspect of the Rome Statute which underscores its nature as a constitutive
document is that it combines jurisdiction to prescribe, to adjudicate, and to enforce all in one
instrument. It is perhaps the implementation and implications of the jurisdictional theories of
the Statute that are its most revolutionary features.63 For, through a rather extraordinary
process, these three jurisdictional categories classically known to international law have been
transformed from norms providing ‘which State can exercise authority over whom, and in
what circumstances,’
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to norms that establish under what conditions the international

community, or more precisely the States Parties to the Statute, may prescribe international
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rules of conduct, may adjudicate breaches of those rules, and may enforce those adjudications.
But even this effort to overcome one of the major historical objections to an ICC drew fire
from then United States Senator, John Ashcroft who argued that: ‘If there is one critical
component of sovereignty, it is the authority to define crimes and punishment. This court
strikes at the heart of sovereignty by taking this fundamental power away from individual
countries and giving it to international bureaucrats.’65 Senator Ashcroft, expressing the
sovereignty concerns he felt for the United States, continued, ‘No aspect of the Court is more
troubling, however, than the fact that it has been framed without apparent respect for--and
indeed in direct contravention of--the United States Constitution …The proposed court . . .
neither reflects nor guarantees the protections of the Bill of Rights. The administration was
right to reject the Court and must remain steadfast in its refusal to join a court that stands as a
rejection of America’s constitutional values.’66

Arguably a cession of sovereignty that abrogates the fundamental principles of any country,
whether that sovereignty be the ability to define crime and punishment or the establishment of
constitutional principles, is a cession that cuts too deep.67 For present purposes, it suffices to
say that the power and legitimacy of these norms was premised on the well-accepted theory of
universal jurisdiction that derives from the idea that when criminal activity rises to a certain
level of harm (the gravity idea threaded through the Statute), or sufficiently important
interests of international society are threatened, all States may apply their laws to the act,
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‘even if it occurred outside its territory, even if it has been perpetrated by a non-national, and
even if its nationals have not been harmed by [it].’68

The Statute does not propose criteria for sorting the international from the national; That is
because the Statute does not focus on this issue at all, leaving it essentially up to the
complementarity principle and State consent regime to sort permissible from impermissible
assertions of the Court’s jurisdiction (to adjudicate). The one explicit clue is the Statute’s
command that the Court is to exercise its jurisdiction only in cases involving ‘the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.’69 This phrase combines both a
substantive limit on the Court’s jurisdiction with its underlying premise--that in a world of
conflicting ‘sovereigns,’ both territorial (States) and non-territorial (the international
community as a whole), some system must be adopted to sort permissible from impermissible
assertions of jurisdiction (to prescribe).70 As will be shown below, the complementarity
principle and State consent regime will generally restrain the exercise of the Court’s
prescriptive jurisdiction such that the Court’s reach does not exceed what reasonable theories
of power distribution and lawmaking authority between ‘sovereigns’ suggest the proper
sphere of the Court’s authority should be.71

2.3.1. Complementarity with State Judicial Systems: A Step Back or a Step Forward?
The Rome Statute reflects the practical experience of the international community in the
Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals in several important ways, and no doubt represents an
improvement over its predecessors. Yet in one respect the ICC will do no better, and may not
68

Higgins, above note115 at 57; see also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(1987) § 404 (noting that States may define punishments for offences which are of ‘universal concern’).
69
Rome Statute, above note 8, art 5 (1); see also ibid. art 1.
70
As Professor Levasseur noted, the problem is essentially akin to one of conflict of laws: international criminal
law as a body of law may apply where an ‘individual’s behaviour (whether a national or a foreigner) has troubled

18

even equal, its sister institutions, for it will operate not on the basis of primacy jurisdiction,
but subject to the principle of complementarity.72

Both the preamble to the Statute and Article 1 express a fundamental principle of the Rome
Statute: that the Court is to be ‘complementary’ to national criminal jurisdictions.73 Although
complementarity is not defined (and indeed, there is no general ‘definition’ section in the
Statute, although there are definitional provisions within particular Articles),74 an analysis of
the Articles on admissibility demonstrates that complementarity does not mean ‘concurrent’
jurisdiction (which it arguably could have under the ILC’s original conception). Under Article
17, the Court may exercise jurisdiction only if: (1) national jurisdictions are ‘unwilling or
genuinely unable’ to exercise jurisdiction; (2) the crime is of sufficient gravity; and (3) the
person has not already been tried for the conduct on which the complaint is based.75 Article
17 further lays out the factors to determine unwillingness as well as the elements for
determining inability on the part of national courts:

2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the court shall consider, having regard to
the principles of due process recognised by international law, whether one or more of the following
exist, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose
of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court . . .;
(b) There has been an unjustifiable delay in the proceedings . . . inconsistent with an intent to bring the
person . . . to justice;
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(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and they were
or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring
the person . . . to justice.76

In light of Article 17, although the stated goal of the court is to complement national court
systems, the Statute clearly outlines processes for judicial review of national court decisions.77
Under the theory of complimentary jurisdiction, the ICC can exercise jurisdiction if a State
shows an unwillingness or inability to genuinely prosecute crimes.78 The ICC will be able to
assume jurisdiction over a person who has already been subjected to court proceedings in a
domestic court if the ICC determines that the proceedings were undertaken ‘for the purpose of
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility,’ or were otherwise not conducted
‘independently or impartially.’79 Of course, the determination as to whether a State is
unwilling or unable to ‘genuinely prosecute,’ or whether prior domestic court proceedings
were independent and impartial, lies solely with the ICC itself.80 Therefore, ‘because it will
set precedents regarding what it considers ‘effective’ and ‘ineffective’ domestic criminal
trials, the ICC will indirectly force States to adopt those precedents or risk having cases called
up before the international court.’81 This constitutes ‘an unprecedented change in the sources
of national lawmaking, one that diminishes the traditional notion of State sovereignty.’82 The
possibility that individuals are capable of appealing out of the court of last resort of their
nation to the ICC means that the ICC will enjoy de facto judicial review. Such a review would
result in the imposition of ICC legal theory upon the national court systems through exercise
of its power to review whether a State’s court is unwilling or unable to prosecute individuals
the ICC has determined fall under its jurisdiction, thus paving way for the ICC to become a
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part of the State legal process by reversing or upholding decisions of what were previously
courts of last resort. 83 But this attractive avenue is unlikely to entice the court. The court will
be well aware of the deadly political fallout that any action in this direction will cause and the
reality of crippling the court through State withdrawals. Thus only in obvious and definite
circumstances will the court address the merit of national court action. On a balance the court
will be careful in avoiding matters of such political volatility. In any case, the
complementarity provisions of the Statute enshrine a very high degree of deference to
national proceedings offering multiple opportunities for challenge and review to safeguard the
primacy of national courts.84 As such, complementarity provides an escape clause from
potential constitutional difficulties, provided the State itself investigates or prosecutes.

The inclusion of complementarity as a ‘cornerstone’85 of the ICC and its substantive and
procedural details reflect strong respect for State sovereignty interests. Although the final
result is accurately described as a ‘delicate balance,’86 it is a balance that takes significant
account of the concerns of those States most focused on protecting national sovereignty.
Overall though, as with other aspects of the Rome Statute, the complementarity provisions
reflect a willingness of States to agree to limitations in principle on State sovereignty, within
the context of a structure that recognises and presupposes the primacy of sovereign States. In
order to ensure that they will be able to utilise the complementarity provisions in all
circumstances, many States are currently engaged in bringing about wide-reaching changes to
their domestic legislation. The need for such changes depends on the state of existing national
law. In many cases, the process of implementation of the Rome Statute has involved
enshrining the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC into the domestic legal order. This
83
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allows, for example, the prosecution of crimes against humanity as such rather than as
ordinary crimes more commonly contemplated in domestic law.87 In other cases,
implementation has involved extending the jurisdiction of domestic courts to cover crimes
committed outside the territory of the State.88 States that provide for this extended jurisdiction
have the comfort of knowing that they are able to prosecute any individual appearing on their
territory who is accused of crimes against humanity by invoking complementarity.

2.4. The International Cooperation Regime: Kowtowing to State Sovereignty
An institutional check on the ICC’s power is that it will have to work through States in
conducting investigations, obtaining evidence, and apprehending suspects. The extent to
which States, by becoming parties to the ICC Statute, take on obligations to assist the ICC in
activities on their own territory is very much an issue of sovereignty. As with other areas
defining the relationship between the ICC and States, the Rome Statute’s final text balances
the willingness of States to make commitments necessary for the ICC to function, with a
recognition that the ICC will operate in a world of sovereign States.89 As Fowler notes,
[t]he accommodation of sovereignty begins with the nature of the general obligation that States
undertake by becoming parties to the ICC Statute. Proponents of a strong ICC favored a duty to
‘comply’ with orders, rather than an obligation of ‘cooperation,’ which was deemed to be vague and
weak. Article 86 of the ICC Statute, ‘[g]eneral obligation to cooperate,’ reflects the latter formulation,
requiring State Parties to ‘cooperate fully with the Court.’ In an art form solution, however, specific
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articles on surrender of suspects and other forms of cooperation require States to ‘comply with
requests’ from the ICC.90

Part 9 of the Statute, entitled ‘International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance’ is one of the
most complex sections of the Rome Statute. The 17 Articles of this Part address the
interaction between the Court and States in the arrest and transfer of suspects to the Court,
and in the conduct of investigations or prosecutions by the Court on State territory. Not
surprisingly, Part 9 is the least ‘supranational’ section of the Statute. Although Article 86
requires States Parties to ‘cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution
of crimes,’91 the Articles that follow are so riddled with exceptions and qualifications that it is
difficult to think of this as anything but an exhortation.92

First, the Statute essentially

bifurcates the assistance the Court may request of States into two categories: requests for the
arrest and surrender of persons to the Court, and requests for everything else the Court might
need to conduct investigations and prosecutions under the Statute.93

As a matter of principle, State Parties must comply with a request from the Court for the
arrest and surrender of a person;94 non-States Parties are under no such obligation.95 The same
is true with respect to requests for other forms of assistance. An important issue that arises is
constitutional prohibitions on extradition of nationals to a foreign jurisdiction that are to be
found in many constitutions. The question is whether such prohibitions are consistent with the
obligation of state parties to surrender suspects to the ICC. Because the ICC will not
prosecute in absentia, the Court must gain physical control over a suspect for a trial to take
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place. State Parties’ obligations to cooperate with the Court in the arrest or surrender of
persons,96 be they nationals or not, are therefore essential to the Court’s ability to function.
Although some exceptions may apply with respect to the duty to provide ‘other forms of
cooperation,’ as in the case of national security in Article 93(4),97 there are no exceptions to
the Statute’s arrest and surrender obligations. The apparent tension between constitutional
prohibitions against extradition of nationals and ICC obligations diminishes upon a closer
examination of the fundamental conceptual differences between ‘surrender’ to an
international criminal court and ‘extradition’ to another state.

98

Article 102 of the Statute

defines ‘surrender’ as ‘the delivering up of a person by a State to the Court’ and extradition as
‘the delivering up of a person by one State to another.’99 This distinction between extradition
and surrender is not merely semantic but substantive. Creators of constitution prohibitions
contemplated ‘horizontal cooperation’ between national courts and not ‘vertical cooperation’
with an international court. As the ICC is not a ‘foreign court’ or ‘foreign jurisdiction,’ but
rather an international one, the constitutional prohibitions against extradition may not apply.
As a purely political matter, there is no guarantee that States would be willing to surrender
their nationals to the processes of an international criminal justice system. The Rome Statute,
for example, establishes an obligation on States Parties to the Statute who are also parties to
the underlying treaty proscribing the crime, to surrender the accused to the jurisdiction of the
International Court.100 Nonetheless, without an effective mechanism for requiring the
compliance of States with the dictates of international law, such a regime continues to rest on
the voluntary compliance of the custodial State. Similarly, the Rome Statute requires that the
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custodial State give priority to the request of the international criminal court for transfer of an
accused over the extradition request of another state. The Statute concurrently, however,
requires that the requesting State consent to the operation of the Court as a precondition to its
exercise of jurisdiction.101

Although States Parties will be required to adapt their national law to ensure that they are able
to fulfil their cooperation obligations under the Statute,102 a significant residual role remains
for national law which will continue to control the form and procedure governing requests for
assistance,103 as well as the execution of such requests, with very limited exceptions.104 In the
case of conduct, the basis of that which constitutes the crime for which the Court is seeking
surrender, the requested State is to give priority to the request from the Court unless the
competing request represents an existing international obligation to extradite the person to the
requesting State, in which case the requested State is to balance the ‘relevant factors’ in
determining whether to give priority to the Court.105

With respect to other forms of cooperation in relation to investigations or prosecutions, States
Parties remain under a general obligation of assistance to the Court.106 This assistance may
take many forms, some of which are listed in Article 93(1), and includes the taking of
evidence, service of documents, facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons as witnesses
or experts before the Court, questioning persons being investigated or prosecuted by the
Court, freezing or seizing of proceeds, property, assets, and instrumentalities of crimes, and
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other such matters. Conspicuously absent is any subpoena power. That is, neither the judges
nor the Prosecutor of the ICC (or defence counsel, presumably) appear to have any power to
compel witnesses to appear.107

As classically conceived, jurisdiction to enforce concerns rules governing the enforcement of
law by a State through its courts, as well as through executive, administrative, and police
action.108 In relation to the envisaged international penal process, the most obvious point is
that the ICC has no police force.109 Indeed, it was unthinkable to propose one either before or
during Rome, although there was at least some precedent for doing so.110 But the orders of the
Court, whether they be arrest warrants, judgments, orders to seize assets, or sentences, will
need to be enforced. The delegates were not unaware of the problem and many provisions of
the Statute address it directly.111 But virtually all of them are premised on three principles.
First, the Court will not be permitted to sanction States directly for non-compliance with its
orders. Rather, the Court will be required to make findings of non-compliance and direct
those to the Assembly of States Parties and the Security Council, in the case of a Security
Council referral to the Court. Second, the Court may not compel State compliance with its
orders.112 That is, it may not compel the appearance of witnesses, it may not compel execution
of arrest warrants, it may not seize bank accounts or government documents of its own
accord. There is no subpoena power; there is no mandamus.113 Third, the personnel of the
107
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Court will have no right, in most cases, to proceed directly to the execution of their duties on
the territories of States, but will work through the authorities present in the requested State,
and will be subject to national law.114 There are three important exceptions to this. First,
pursuant to Article 56, a judge from the Court may be present ‘to observe and make
recommendations or orders regarding the collection and preservation of evidence and the
questioning of persons.115 Second, the Prosecutor may be authorised by the Pre-Trial
Chamber to take ‘specific investigative steps’ within the territory of a State party without the
cooperation of the State, if the State is clearly unable to execute requests for cooperation
because its judicial system has collapsed.116 Finally, pursuant to Article 99(4), the Prosecutor
may under limited circumstances execute specific requests for assistance (other than arrest
warrants)117 directly on the territory of a State Party.118

Criminal prosecution is inherently tied to notions of national sovereignty and the control over
persons and territory which are fundamental to that notion. While international cooperation
and judicial assistance as set out in the Rome Statute is at the very heart of the ultimate
effectiveness of the Court by placing an affirmative obligation on States,119 this may be
impeded by inherently national interests embedded in prohibiting and prosecuting certain
types of conduct. In fact, some argue that the Nuremberg tribunal itself succeeded only
because it in some ways substituted itself for the inability of the German government to try
war criminals, the obstacle of sovereignty of the German State as a bar to the enforcement of
justice having been destroyed by the historic events of May and June, 1945. Arguably, the
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successful establishment of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals represents a fundamental
departure from Nuremberg in that the authority under which they were constituted derives not
from their status as occupied territories, but from truly international exercises of Security
Council power. Nonetheless, both the Yugoslavia and the Rwanda tribunals were constituted
in the midst of continuing national disarray, where the functioning national legal system had
been subverted and compromised and could not be said to reflect basic due process
requirements (Yugoslavia) or had collapsed altogether and did not exist (Rwanda). It is
questionable whether a criminal justice mechanism which expects to operate alongside fully
operational national legal systems can do so without considerable political difficulty.

III. Reflections on the ICC: Merits and Demerits of the System
3.1. The Case for the ICC
Much of the desire for a permanent solution arises from the international abhorrence of the
atrocities committed in internal and international conflicts. This abhorrence leads to several
policy rationales supportive of an international court. The first rationale is deterrence. Many
people believe that if a permanent court will punish international crimes, such as genocide
and crimes against humanity, such punishment will deter future potential criminals.120
Supporters of the ICC hold to deterrence as an important rationale.121 Some people are
concerned that the furtherance of human rights in the world will be stymied as long as there is
no price to be paid for violating those rights. They argue that ‘[i]mpunity not only encourages
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the recurrence of abuses against human dignity, but also strips human rights and humanitarian
law of their deterrent effect.’ 122

Creation of a permanent court would remove the accusation that has dogged the ad hoc
tribunals, the fact that they are reactive and narrowly focused to solving the international
emergency of the moment thus not wholesome institutions to contribute to universality and
specificity in international law. While some movement has occurred in the UN to standardise
and codify international crimes, the structure for the international court did not keep pace
until the last decade of the 20th Century. The creation of a permanent court would be
beneficial to the international community because it would help address what some
internationalists see as the main failings of the international system of justice, the lack of a
permanent and effective enforcement mechanism.123 A permanent international criminal court
would surmount the criticism that whenever ad hoc tribunals are organised to deal with war
crimes, it is solely to punish the vanquished. These tribunals are, therefore, open to the valid
criticism that their purpose is just to achieve ‘victor’s justice’ and that the tribunals are in use
only to exact retribution for the terrors of war.124 As Justice Murphy said in his dissent in Re
Yamashita, ‘[i]f we are ever to develop an orderly international community based on a
recognition of human dignity, it is of the utmost importance that the necessary punishment of
those guilty of atrocities be as free as possible from the ugly stigma of revenge and
vindictiveness.’ 125
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Another reason supporting the establishment of the ICC is the ad hoc tribunals’ lack of
consistency and failure to establish precedent. Past ad hoc tribunals have been marked by a
singular lack of consistency and lack of judicial memory.126 ‘From a legal standpoint, ad hoc
tribunals cannot hope to achieve a desired level of consistency in the interpretation and
application of international law because their statutes are inevitably tailored to meet the
demands of the specific situation that brought them into being.’127 In this context, the ICC
will play an important role in standardising international justice. A related concern, in
addition to consistency, is whether the political will exists from crisis to crisis to establish a
tribunal.128 Many people fear that judicial fatigue will set in, resulting in crimes going
unpunished. Questions are naturally raised concerning why one conflict deserves a tribunal
and another does not.129 For example, the UN established tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, but not for Iraq, Somalia, or Sudan. If there were a permanent ICC, the will
required to begin an investigation into atrocities would not depend upon the politics of the UN
or national leaders.

Finally countries rarely punish war criminals on their own. Frequently, the end of conflict
brings a desire to return to normalcy. Additionally, conflicts often end with a negotiated
settlement between the warring parties. Settlement often includes amnesty as a condition for
the cessation of hostilities, freeing otherwise criminally negligent individuals from
prosecution. New governments may also include individuals who are responsible for war
crimes. Such countries are naturally unwilling to prosecute war criminals. Supporters of the
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ICC claim that a permanent international institution would have the political distance
necessary to bring these criminals, regardless of their positions, to justice.

3.2. The Case Against the Court
One major problem for the ICC is that so many people are accused and there are too few
judges. In its current conception, the court will not have the capacity to operate more than a
few trials at a time. Proponents of the court point to this issue as a reason to allow future
growth in the size of the Court.130 However, it is difficult to imagine an international court
large enough to handle thousands of trials in a timely fashion, such the Rwandan situation
would require, and yet remain affordable to the world community.

The Court presumes that after an armed conflict not every country has, or will have, a legal
system in place to perform such tasks. Physical distance will still hamper evidence gathering
and discovery where there is no credible legal system in place to do it for the Court. Reliance
on local legal systems is also problematic because it depends on their willingness to assist.
Discovery is nearly always an adversarial situation. Attempting to use local law enforcement
when it too may be resistant will defeat such efforts completely. The touted swift justice
simply will not occur.131

The real threat to the Court’s stature is the prospect that it will be little used. If the
international court is to command respect, it must have sufficient jurisdiction to play a real
role in the struggle against international crime. There is no danger that the court will be
trivialized as long as it is making a valuable contribution to criminal justice.132 Hence, the
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presumption of the ICC’s supporters is that it will be used and expanded as necessary into the
future.

While some developing States may look to the ICC to model their criminal code, most
developed States would resist such a model in favour of their system already in use. It is
conceivable that reformers would seek to leverage change in their national judicial systems
through seeking to expand the influence of the ICC into the domestic sphere. An obvious area
where this would likely occur is capital punishment. If the ICC were to become the model of
criminal justice, States continuing to impose capital punishment would come under increasing
pressure to alter their laws to conform to the international standard. Indeed, minority interests
(including individual defendants with creative defence attorneys) could seek to use the ICC
standard to overcome majority chosen positions in criminal law. Further argument is made
that the continued existence of the ‘prosecute or extradite’ notion of international criminal
obligations has a distinct advantage which may suffer as a result of the establishment of
international criminal jurisdiction over certain international crimes. ‘Prosecute or extradite’
means that international criminal laws are incorporated into the domestic system, thus
resulting in better integration of those laws into the legal culture of the incorporating national
legal order. If international crimes are tried before an international tribunal whose decisions
and judgments have no precedential value in a national court, and whose persuasive value
may be considerably minimised due to political or other considerations, that incorporation
effect is lost.

Perhaps the central issue facing the ICC is its effect on sovereignty. Beyond the general threat
to national sovereignty, the Rome Statute and the ICC directly conflict with many national
constitutions. The ICC’s supranational jurisdiction cannot be reconciled with the judicial
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system created by the constitutions of many States. The seemingly vague and ambiguous
crimes that the ICC would prosecute could not pass constitutional scrutiny in a number of
countries. And there are no provisions in the Rome Statute for many of the protections
guaranteed by some Bill of Rights--for example, trial by jury. In many States, the constitution
is the supreme law of the land with all other laws (whether national or international) being
subordinate. With countless judicial decisions in domestic courts trumpeting the unbridled
supremacy of their respective constitutions, it will be interesting to see whether the Rome
Statute will triumph even where it seemingly contravenes a constitutional provision. While
arguably a municipal law provision cannot provide justification for failure to observe an
international obligation, with the United States leading the dissident group, it will not be an
easy argument to advance. Coupled to constitutional provisions is the fact that judicial power
in States is vested in its courts which are ordained and established by the national assembly.
Thus arguably only a court of the State may exercise jurisdiction over a citizen for offences
committed within the State. Therefore, at a theoretical and significantly a technical level the
Rome Statute would conflict with State constitutions if the ICC attempted to assert
jurisdiction over a citizens for offences committed on a particular State’s territory.

Finally, the ICC fails to address the problem that it identifies. Justice is an attempt to set
things right, after the crime has been committed. The genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass
rapes have been committed long before the judicial process can begin. By the time evidence
has been gathered and suspects apprehended, the value of the judicial remedy begins to
degrade, particularly when dealing with crimes on a massive scale. Ultimately, life
incarceration remains unlikely for the chief perpetrators if historical precedent means
anything.133 The international community appropriately desires the end to crimes against
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humanity, war crimes, genocide, and aggression. The experience of generations has been that
punishment, while important, is at best a poor remedy for the victims. The victim’s greatest
desire is to avoid victimisation in the first place. Therefore, the best solutions to today’s
humanitarian crises lie not in adjudication that is too late for the traumatised victims, but in
prevention. Perhaps Carrie Gustafson is right, and justice such as is envisioned by the ICC
should be abandoned because it only perpetuates violence.134 Perhaps adherence to the tenets
of the world’s greatest moral and ethical philosophers would provide a better solution to both
international crime and punishment.135 However, prevention, whatever its form, of war and
criminal activity may be as difficult to achieve as effective punishment provided for by the
ICC.

VI. Conclusion
As a matter of process, the making of the Rome Statute was extraordinary. Not only was the
Statute voted on by States, thereby erasing any illusions one may have held about the
continuing relevance of absolute paradigms of sovereignty in modern times, but the law made
by the Statute extends to the entire world in cases involving referrals by the Security Council
under Chapter VII. ‘The ICC will directly or indirectly affect all members of the international
community. When the ICC becomes a reality, Third States will not be immune from the ICC
irrespective of whether they ratify the Rome Statute. In particular, non-States Parties will not
be able to block prosecution of their nationals. The effectiveness of the ICC and its impact on
human rights and humanitarian law enforcement as well as on the existing international
criminal justice cooperation system will depend on the degree of support it enjoys among the
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most influential members of the international community.’136 Hopefully, non-participating
States, whatever their individual status and influence may be forced into a situation where
they will have to acknowledge the existence of the ICC as an effective and broadlyrepresented international criminal judiciary that even non-States Parties have to deal with.

As for the legal rules comprising the Statute’s substance, several features of the Statute
challenge the Westphalian model, and the unwritten ‘constitution’ of international law
premised upon it. The Court will exercise jurisdiction over individuals, including Heads of
States. The three crimes currently defined within its jurisdiction will cover the internal, as
well as the international, commission of atrocities on a massive scale. Their codification in the
Rome Statute strains the current conception of international law as consensual and poses a
challenge to the content and status of customary international law. As argued by Sadat and
Carden, ‘the prescriptive jurisdiction of the Court rests on a new theory of universal
international jurisdiction which embodies in it the seeds of a new approach to the repartition
of competences between national and international legal orders.’137 Further the Assembly of
States Parties will take decisions by supermajority vote, thus much of the ‘law’ of the ICC,
like the law of the European Union, will have a supranational character.138

Some see the Court as a monster arguing that: ‘If allowed to stand--and to thrive and grow, as
its champions intend--this Court will sound the death knell for national sovereignty, and for
the freedoms associated with limited, constitutional government.’139 But there are those on the
extreme end who feel that sovereignty is an outmoded concept and should be discarded,
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dismissing the whole notion of sovereignty as a false idea and suggesting that for legal
purposes, we might do well to relegate the term to the shelf of history as a relic from an
earlier era.140 Overall, the continued relevance of sovereignty should be balanced against
reality. Though State sovereignty is still a cornerstone of international law it should not be
seen as the bulwark from which State prerogatives are defended from foreign infringement,
even when this ‘infringement’ aims to secure the rights on individuals and entities within the
domestic sphere.141
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